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Abstract: Fiscal federalism is a process of redistribution of fiscal decision-making power in an effort to 
improve the performance of the public sector in resource mobilization, efficient resource allocation and in 
the process enabling the economy achieve fast and sustainable economic growth. This paper addresses 
the economic rationale, implications and concerns of pursuing fiscal federalism in a poor country and in 
a political environment of ethnic federalism. The main findings suggest that when fiscal decentralization 
is exercised with high horizontal and vertical imbalances, it fails to diversify public output in line with the 
preferences and priorities of local population and to internalize the decisions of regional governments 
within their own jurisdictions. This in turn encourages the prevalence of big and yet weak government 
that extracts resources and fails to allocate for the purpose of sustainable and shared economic growth. 
 
Key Concepts: Fiscal federalism, vertical and horizontal imbalances, federal grants, 
ethnic federalism, economic growth, poverty.     
 




A growing number of countries have adopted fiscal federalism in an effort to 
improve the performance of their public sector. The underlying theme of the reforms is 
restructuring the public sector and improving its efficiency. In the context of fiscal 
policy, the reforms entailed decisions in identifying the optimal distribution of functions 
and powers between the federal and sub-national governments. This process introduces 
specialization of functions and changing the very relationship between the government 
and the citizen-voters in important ways.   
 
Fiscal federalism can essentially be described as the choice and distribution of 
fiscal decision-making power across multi-leveled governments. The adoption of fiscal 
decentralization in most countries has taken a clear departure from their practice of 
centralized fiscal system within a unitary political regime. The failure of the centralized 
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system of economic and political administration is one of the forces behind the 
temptation of a number of countries to experiment with the decentralization of both 
political and fiscal power (Tanzi, 1996). In some cases, fiscal decentralization followed 
the political imperative of establishing federal political structure. However, fiscal 
decentralization might involve significant economic cost and inefficiency in resource 
utilization when decentralization is exercised before local capacity is developed. After 
all, partial decentralization may not necessarily bring improved governance and 
accountability to the people at the grass root level that responds to local priorities and 
preferences. 
 
Fiscal federalism in Ethiopia, the subject matter of this paper, has been adopted 
within a unique political landscape of ethnic federalism. The TPLF-led government that 
replaced the Dergue has redrawn the political map of the country and adopted ethnic 
based federal structure of government. This experiment has been formalized in the 1994 
Constitution. However, the constitutional provisions operate with political centralism 
that has remained to be the distinguishing feature of the current political system.  
 
The theme of this article is that fiscal federalism in the context of ethnic 
politics and de facto political centralization continue to hamper the realization of the 
economic potentials of the country and hence constrains efforts to address core 
economic problems. We address how and to what extent the policy and practice of fiscal 
federalism in the country has affected fiscal discipline, resource allocation, and 
efficiency of resource utilization as well as growth performance of sectors in the 
economy. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the 
main strands of the theory of fiscal federalism and develops an economic argument on 
issues of fiscal federalism, section three reviews the fiscal system of Ethiopia and 
section four addresses the issues involved in the practice of fiscal federalism in Ethiopia 
and their implications on fiscal performance. The final section draws concluding 
remarks and highlights areas for policy actions. 
 
2. The Theory of Fiscal Federalism 
 
Federalism is a system in which the lower levels of government are represented 
in the central government and its institutions. Pursing the federal structure involves both 
decentralization of decision-making power and representation of regional units at the 
national level. This process influences the allocation and distribution of economic 




resources across regions and economic agents.   
 
Fiscal federalism derives its nature and characteristics from constitutional 
provisions as well as the state of economic development, the pattern of income and 
resource distribution, and the institutional capacity of the system. The constitutional 
provisions define the framework within which decision-making would be exercised 
and establishes the vertical and horizontal structures that find meaning within the 
prevailing socio-economic environment of the system. The vertical structure defines the 
assignment of fiscal decision-making power between the federal and lower tiers of 
government. The horizontal structure outlines the nature of interaction across cross-
sections of government levels. This aspect addresses how regional governments interact 
to each other especially when there are externalities and spillovers.  
 
The main economic rationale behind fiscal decentralization is improving 
efficiency of public resource utilization, creating enabling environment for private 
sector development and the growth of the national economy. The theory of fiscal 
federalism addresses three issues related to fiscal decision-making: assignment of 
responsibilities and functions between the federal government and the regional 
governments, the assignment of taxation power and the design of inter-governmental 
transfer (subsidy) of fiscal resources coupled with provisions about the borrowing 
windows to sub-national governments. These factors give rise to a third issue of the 
relative size of the public sector in the national economy. It is therefore the dynamics of 
these processes and public policy choices that ultimately shapes the performance of the 
fiscal sector and its impact on the national economy.  
 
2.1. Fiscal Function Assignment Issues 
 
An important aspect of the exercise of fiscal federalism is the assignment of 
fiscal functions to the federal and the sub-national governments and the appropriate 
means of financing these responsibilities. The theory of fiscal federalism does not 
provide a clear-cut separation of fiscal responsibilities that would promote economic 
efficiency and resource distribution. The broad thrust of normative theory is that 
expenditure responsibilities in areas of macroeconomic stabilization and redistribution 
functions should remain within the domain of the federal government whereas 
allocation functions should be assigned to lower levels of government (Oates, 1999; 
Shah, 1999; Musgrave, 1983). The argument is based on the reasoning that lower levels 




of government have limited capacity and policy instruments to provide stabilization and 
redistribution functions. Due to the nature of the responsibilities, the federal 
government usually assumes macroeconomic stabilization and income redistribution 
functions and make sure that regional governments would not take measures that are not 
compatible with such functions. Moreover, there are functions such as national defense 
and foreign affairs that have national public good character and hence usually assigned 
to the central government.  
 
Fiscal decentralization and the assignment of functions can generate economic 
efficiency of the public sector. If preferences are heterogeneous across jurisdictions, 
which is most likely the case, decentralized decision-making power as to the provision 
of local public goods and services improves efficiency by tailoring services to the 
preferences of the local population. The main argument is that local governments are 
closer to the local population and can identify their choice and preferences better than 
the central government. Accordingly, when the decision to provide a bundle of public 
goods is made by local officials and these officials are directly accountable to the local 
voters, there is an incentive for the local public officials to provide services that reflect 
the preferences of the local population. Moreover, as long as there is close relation 
between the benefits from public services and taxes on the local taxpayers, there is 
additional incentive to utilize resources efficiently and cost effectively. At least by 
implication, the theory recognizes the need for local authorities to exercise choice in the 
provision of public services that are of higher local demand instead of resorting to the 
unitary solution. The decentralization theorem suggests that, under such conditions, 
decentralization of fiscal decision-making can improve efficiency of the public sector 
and the welfare of the local population. 
 
Once the allocation of expenditure responsibilities is conducted according to 
such broad principles, the fiscal system needs to address the issue of assigning taxing 
power that broadly identifies who should tax, where and what (Musgrave, 1983). The 
imposition of taxes, in the absence of lump-sum source of taxation, always involves a 
certain degree of economic inefficiency. In the context of fiscal federalism, the 
assignment process needs to identify the comparative efficiency and effectiveness of 
providing the fiscal instruments to the multi-tier decision-making centers so as to 
finance public functions and activities in the most efficient manner possible. 
What kind of taxes should be assigned to the federal government and which 
should be assigned to the local governments? The theory and practice in the assignment 




of taxation power identifies the following main criteria in assignment process: taxes on 
mobile tax bases, redistributive taxes, taxes that could easily be exported to other 
jurisdictions, taxes on unevenly distributed tax bases, taxes that have large cyclical 
fluctuations, and taxes that involve considerable economies of scale in tax 
administration should be assigned to the national or federal government (Sobel, 1997; 
Musgrave, 1983; Tanzi and Zee, 2000, Oates, 1996). There are efficiency and equity 
considerations behind such principle of tax assignment.  
 
The assignment of taxing power between the federal and the regional 
governments and the provision for concurrent power to share establishes the basic link 
in which the behavior of one of the parties would influence the decision making power 
of the other and its effective tax base. There is a possibility for vertical tax externality 
that might require additional policy instruments to correct their effect on other levels of 
government (Keen, 1998). When there are clear cases in which vertical tax externalities 
are prevalent, the tension between the federal and the state governments would arise. 
This in turn would require mechanisms for the assignment of taxing power and revenue 
based on the nature and characteristics of the tax base.  
 
  The assignment of taxing power is a thorny issue in fiscal policy and its 
application is influenced by a number of considerations. First, despite the legislative 
assignment of taxes, the actual potency of the tax network depends on the nature and 
development of the national economy, the relative distribution of economic activities 
across jurisdictions, and the administrative efficiency of the taxation system. Second, 
the practice of fiscal federalism, especially when citizens across regions with diverse 
economic and demographic situations are treated unequally, gives rise to the violation 
of one of the core principles of horizontal fiscal equity. Moreover, fiscal 
decentralization might also potentially breach the principle of vertical fiscal equity by 
not treating taxpayers with different capacity to pay differently. Third, despite the 
monopoly of taxing power resides at the disposal of the government, the reach of the 
taxation network depends on the economic circumstances of the potential taxpayers. 
 
2.2. Fiscal Imbalances and Intergovernmental Transfers 
 
The distribution of the tax base and the demand for public goods and services 
does not follow symmetrical pattern and this gives rise to the emergence of fiscal 
imbalances. A number of reasons, both economic and social, contribute to the mismatch 




between the expenditure responsibilities and the capacity of the lower levels of 
government to raise sufficient revenue to finance their expenditure. Vertical fiscal 
imbalances are the result of allocation of functions the cost of provision of which is 
higher than the sources of revenue assigned to local governments. This indicates the 
case in which the level of revenue source decentralization is lower than the 
decentralization of expenditure responsibilities. Horizontal fiscal imbalance emerges 
usually as a result of concentration of tax bases due to uneven distribution of economic 
resources and economic activity across regions whereas expenditure requirements are 
spread more evenly.  
 
The problems of fiscal imbalances require measures that include the provision 
of subsidies as well as policies that promote balanced growth of regional economies. 
The process of changing the taxation base of regional economies is slow and requires 
consistent policies that address the underlying sources of inequalities across regional 
economies. Inter-governmental transfers or grant systems, however, might generate 
their own problems of the commons. When vertical fiscal imbalance is significant and 
local governments depend excessively on the federal fiscal grants, their fiscal autonomy 
would be compromised. Moreover, local government officials and the population would 
have the incentive to maximize their federal grant receipts as long as they do not 
proportionately share the burden of taxation. Where local governments do not bear the 
cost of their spending decisions, there are incentives for local governments to expand 
their budget beyond their means and this behavior is prevalent when the benefits are 
concentrated whereas the cost of financing such benefits is drawn from the common 
pool.  
 
Inter-governmental fiscal transfers involve two main decisions even if most 
federal systems pursue different approaches. The federal government needs to decide on 
the aggregate pool of federal grants and then the pool has to be distributed among the 
respective lower sub-national governments. The federal government can decide on the 
size of the federal grant pool based on certain parameters or on some ad hoc 
mechanisms. Once the pool of federal grants is decided, the distribution of such grants 
across regions or local levels of government follows a number of possibilities. The 
federal government may exercise discretionary decisions to distribute such resources. 
However, the risk of such discretionary exercise is that allocation might be influenced 
by political considerations instead of real need for assistance at the local levels. The 
most conventional way is the use of some grant distribution formula that takes into 




account indicators of needs and other factors at the sub-national government levels.  
 
2.3. Decentralization and the size of the government 
 
The appropriate role and relative size of government in national economies are 
controversial political economy issues. The actual size of government in national 
economies is influenced by a number of economic, social, and political factors (Lowery 
and Berry, 1987; Rodrik, 1996). The normative argument about the proper size of 
government is also influenced by a wave of development thinking of the day.  
 
One distinctive feature of the issue, however, has been the phenomenal shift in 
policy thinking about the role of the government in economic development. In much of 
the first half of the 20th Century, government was considered the main force to bring 
about economic development and transformation especially in the underdeveloped 
countries. This line of thinking was confronted with criticism when government failure 
became pervasive. By the 1980s, the widely held view among global policy makers and 
academics was that big government was the problem rather than the solution in the 
effort of countries to bring about economic development. Accordingly, the 1980s and 
1990s witnessed policy prescriptions that attempted to reduce the size of the 
government in national economies.  
 
 In the current post-Washington-Consensus era, the pendulum of policy 
thinking seems swinging with a more pragmatic tone. The prevailing argument is that 
smart and strong government and market forces can have a dynamically changing 
relation in which developmental governments play a critical role in investment, human 
capital formation, technology promotion, and institutional building without hampering 
the forces of the market in the system.  
 
Does fiscal decentralization have influence on the size of the government? The 
relation between fiscal decentralization and the relative size of the public sector in 
national economies is not clearly established (Ehadie, 1994; Grossman, 1989). The 
public finance theory identifies forces that shape the extent of government intervention 
in a national economy. These forces include market failure, imperfect information, 
incomplete market, externalities, public goods and significant unemployment of 
resources. The extent to which these forces prevail in a system influences and shapes 
the relative size of government intervention in the economy. The possible impact of the 




process of fiscal decentralization on the overall size of the public sector is moderated 
through a number of factors such as the political institutions, the extent to which the 
cost of providing public services is internalized at local levels, ideological position of 
the government in power, and the autonomy of local governments.  
 
As we argued earlier, the process of fiscal decentralization can potentially 
improve efficiency in the provision of public goods by identifying the preferences of 
local population and internalize the cost within the same jurisdiction. When political 
institutions enforce accountability and local officials are responsible to the local 
constituency, there is incentive for decision makers to achieve goals that are in line with 
the preferences of the local population. The internalization of the cost of public service 
provision would provide extra incentive to discipline fiscal decisions and operate within 
hard budget constraint. If the expenditure choice of local governments is linked to 
taxation on the local population, there would be strong reason to maintain fiscal 
discipline and operate towards a smaller and efficient government size. However, as 
long as the benefits from provision of local public services accrue to those who are not 
paying for the cost of such provisions, there is a tendency for excessive demand and 
increase in the size of the government. This might lead to the expansion of the public 
sector without a correspondingly positive effect on the performance of the national 
economy. 
 
3. Features of the Ethiopian Fiscal System 
 
The fiscal system of Ethiopia has historically been characterized by high 
centralization and concentration of fiscal decision-making power at the center. 
Moreover, the structure of the fiscal system shares important features with other 
underdeveloped economies in terms of reliance on indirect taxes, dependency on 
international trade taxes, and persistent fiscal deficits.  
 
The current fiscal system of Ethiopia features some departures from the 
previous systems and striking continuities in the structure and essential elements of 
fiscal performance of the economy. Table 1 summarizes the main features of fiscal 
aggregates of Ethiopia. These attributes suggest that either the government is not willing 
to fundamentally change its fiscal policy stance or the fiscal system is governed by the 
structural features of the economy that are not easily amenable to change in response to 
fiscal policy reforms. A closer examination of the main features of the fiscal system 




suggests that both factors play a role in the process. The nature and structure of the 
economy, the resulting tax bases, the excessive dependence on international trade taxes 
and external grants, and persistent deficits all contribute to the prevailing features of the 
fiscal sector as do the fiscal policy stance of the government.    
 
Table1- Ethiopia: The Structure of Government Revenue and Expenditure  
1980/1 – 2001/02 (As a percentage of GDP) 
Period Tax Non-Tax External  
Grants 
Recurrent Capital Deficit 
before 
Grants 
1980/1-1983/4 14.00 4.60 2.21 19.39 7.70 -8.48 
1984/5-1985/6 13.35 5.90 4.06 19.66 9.98 -10.38 
1986/7-1990/1 13.72 6.48 3.27 22.02 9.24 -11.05 
1991/2-1994/5 9.59 3.89 2.80 14.86 7.52 -8.90 
1995/6-1997/8 12.39 6.30 3.04 14.87 9.24 -6.42 
1998/9-2001/02 13.27 6.59 4.04 22.21 9.54 -12.37 
1980/1-1990/1 13.76 5.69 3.03 20.63 8.81 -9.99 
1991/2-2001/2 11.69 5.53 3.31 17.54 8.73 -9.48 
1980/1-2001/2 12.72 5.61 3.17 19.08 8.77 -9.74 
Source: computed from Ministry of Finance and Economic Development data sources  
 
For the period 1980/81-2001/02, the government on average extracted about 18 
percent of GDP from the public and spent about 28 percent of GDP, of which recurrent 
spending took more than 19 percent and only 9 percent left for capital spending. This 
behavior of excessive spending left an average fiscal gap of about 10 percent. 
Foreigners provided about 3 percent as charity and lent about 4 percent of GDP and the 
rest was financed mainly from domestic banking system. A fiscal system that resorts to 
borrowing to cover about 36 percent of its spending appetite would sooner or later 
confront the consequence of its behavior. It is an important predictor of a looming crisis. 
This behavior of fiscal spending also affected the macroeconomic situation in which 
aggregate expenditure run in excess of domestic production. The country has become 
increasingly dependent on foreign aid and borrowing to finance its consumption and 
investment expenditure.  
 
The fiscal system, nonetheless, witnessed important changes over time. 
Government revenue increased during the 1980s and reached a pick of 24.8 percent of 
GDP in 1988/89 before it declined drastically during the subsequent two years of 
political turmoil in the country. The fiscal regime was extremely coercive and led to 
distortions in resource allocation. The prohibitively high marginal tax rate had driven 




most activities underground and tax evasion and corruption were on the rise. Such a 
system was indeed unsustainable and the change in the political regime precipitates a 
collapse in the fiscal system. The decline in revenue was particularly severe from 
business profit taxes, export taxes and revenue from government investment income. 
The collection of government revenue collapsed from about a quarter of GDP to about 
10.6 percent by 1991/92.  
 
The transitional government introduced a number of fiscal and monetary policy 
reforms that had mixed implications on the revenue collection. The amendment in the 
tax codes, devaluation and gradual depreciation of the exchange rate, elimination of 
taxes on exports (except coffee duties), and the privatization process have had important 
implications on the amount and structure of government revenue. The average domestic 
revenue to GDP ratio has recovered gradually and for the period 1991/92 to 2001/02 the 
average reached about 17.2 percent with a gradual and yet increasing trend. The average 
tax revenue for the period was about 11.7 percent of GDP.   
 
One typical feature of the tax structure is its narrow base. There is an 
increasing dependency on foreign trade, especially import, taxes in recent years. The 
devaluation of the currency and its subsequent depreciation over time somewhat 
expanded the domestic currency denominated tax base on imports. As figure 1 depicts, 
the shift in the composition of tax revenue was significant and such a trend brings its 
own problems to fiscal management and planning besides its possible effects on the 
macroeconomic stability of the economy and sectors with higher intensity of imports.  
 
The overall share of tax revenue to GDP is small both in absolute terms as well 
as relative to the average for developing countries. The tax revenue-to-GDP ratio for 
developing countries is about 18 percent and for African countries is about 20 percent. 
The ratio of tax revenue in GDP for advanced countries is significantly higher than 
developing countries, at about 38 percent, reflecting the state of economic development, 
the tax base and the efficiency of tax administration (Tanzi and Zee, 2000; Rodrik, 
1996). This pattern could broadly be attributable to the structure and performance of the 
economy, the administration of the taxation system, and the design of the taxation 
system. 
 
A longer view of the fiscal resource allocation behavior of the government, 
despite marginal changes in some aspects of the fiscal components, suggests that there 




has not been enduring and significant shift in policy over the past two or so decades. 
The current government in power, except some marginal changes, shares important 
characteristics and behavior in fiscal policy with its predecessor. The current regime 
spends about 26 percent of GDP and extracts from the public about 17 percent of GDP. 
Foreigners still provide about 3 percent as grants and lend about 3.7 percent of GDP. 
The remainder of about 2.4 percent of GDP has been financed from domestic 
borrowing. The relative performance of the current fiscal regime shows some 
improvement and yet it still covers about 23 percent of its spending by borrowing. 
   
The result of such features of government revenue and expenditure has been 
the emergence of persistent fiscal deficits and the accumulation of public debt. 
Domestic government revenue apparently has been barely enough to cover recurrent 
government expenditure let alone to generate resources for financing capital 
expenditure. The level of deficit has increased so much so that in recent years it has 
been as much as the total tax revenue collection of the government. Such a stance of 
fiscal policy is unsustainable and the external grants, even if important to partially 
narrow the gap, would not and could not resolve the problem. The government has 
increased its appetite for borrowing from foreign sources to bridge the gap and when 
external borrowing does not satisfy it resorts quite easily to borrow from the domestic 
banking sector. 
  
The fiscal performance of the country is reflections of a typical 
underdeveloped and agrarian based economy in which the majority of the population 
lives in chronic poverty and a government that devotes its effort to extraction of 
resources from the economy and failing to allocate these resources to priority areas and 
sectors of the economy. When this is coupled with a de facto fiscal centralization and 
stance of inefficient public resource allocation, it fails to address the priorities of the 
majority of the population and hence becomes increasingly unsustainable. However, 
both political imperatives and changes in the overall economic policy of the country 
opened the door for fiscal policy innovation. We will address this issue in the next 
section and assess the context in which fiscal federalism is being implemented in the 
country. 
 
4. Fiscal Federalism within Ethnic Federalism 
 
Fiscal federalism operates within the political and administrative framework of 




a system. Fiscal decentralization is a process and a continuum of degrees. Even 
centralized political and fiscal systems, to a certain degree, exercise administrative 
delegation of fiscal responsibilities. For a country with an initially unitary system of 
government, reforms towards fiscal federalism entail devolution of decision making 
power from the center to lower levels of government.  
 
 The policy of fiscal federalism has been put place in Ethiopia within a unique 
political and economic environment. The overthrow of the military regime of Ethiopia 
in 1991 by a coalition of rebel forces set the stage for a drastic shift in the political 
landscape of the country. Most of the rebel groups, at least the dominant ones, were 
formed as liberation fronts of an ethnic group or region. These groups had inbuilt 
motivation of their movements, derived from their ideological backgrounds and 
anchored on their interpretation of addressing ethnic problems. The TPLF regime seized 
power and created shadow political organizations after its own image and made 
effective use of such political effigies to concentrate political power and effectively 
forming a quasi-one party system in the guise of federalism.  
 
During the transition period, 1991-1995, the transitional Charter was designed 
to conduct political experiment of reorganization of the country along ethno-linguistic 
lines. The Charter and subsequent proclamations (proclamation No. 7/1992, 
Proclamation No. 43/1993) redrawn the political map of the country, established 
regional self-governments, promulgated laws to the establishment of a central 
transitional government and the regional self-governments, and provided division of 
political power between the central and regional governments. Moreover, a scheme that 
defines the expenditure responsibilities of the central government and the regional 
governments and the corresponding sources of revenue was defined (Proclamation No. 
33/1992).  
 
The process culminated in the formalization of the ethnic-territorial federal 
structure of government with the adoption of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia in 1994. The Constitution formalized the experiment of ethno-
linguistic based structure of government into a federal structure. The Constitution 
proclaims a parliamentary democracy with bicameral chambers at the federal level and 
a chamber parliament at the regional level. The House of Peoples Representatives and 
the House of Federation constitute the federal parliament whereas the State Councils 
represent the parliament at regional level. 





Federalism operates by ensuring equitable (proportional) representation of sub-
national units in the federal government. One of the core pillars of the Constitution is 
that it vests supreme power in the hands of nations, nationalities and peoples of 
Ethiopia. This translates into the formation of regional states that have equal horizontal 
power. The Constitution hence violates equality of all Ethiopians in their representation 
both at regional and federal levels of government. Moreover, the process of its framing, 
the participation process in its design, flexibility for amendment when compelling 
rationale emerges remain contentious issues in the discussion of the Ethiopian 
Constitution. These features have implications both in the legislative and executive 
branches of government and hence on the effectiveness of the federal solution to 
countries with diverse socio-economic conditions. 
 
The Ethiopian federal structure consists of nine regional states and two 
chartered city administrations. The regional states are further divided into Zones and 
Woredas creating a four-tier level of government. In effect, there are 11 regions, 66 
zones, 550 Woredas and 6 special Woredas under the new arrangement. The Woreda 
serves as the basic unit of administration in the framework. The devolution process is 
still in progress and is evolving and has not yet widely reached the local levels of 
government. The capacity to design and execute policies at the local level is quite weak 
and for all practical purposes, the Ethiopian federal system has a two-tier level of 
government structure. 
 
The Constitution divides responsibilities under the jurisdictions of the federal 
government and the regional governments. Responsibilities for the federal government 
include defense, public security and order, international relations, citizenship and 
immigration, international and inter-state trade, fiscal and monetary policies, currency, 
banking and domestic borrowing by states (Proc. No. 1/1995).  
 
 The Constitution provides extensive decision-making legislative and executive 
powers and responsibilities to the regional states. The most notable ones are: enactment 
of state constitution and laws; formulation and execution of economic, social and 
development policies, strategies and plans; administration of land and other natural 
resources in the territory; levy and collection of taxes assigned to the regional states; 
designing standards for state level civil services and payment; and maintenance of state 
level security forces. The Constitution reserves all powers not provided to the federal 




government to the regional governments. 
 
The Constitution, unlike the Charter, provides power to regional governments 
and does not impose subordination of their rights to the federal government. This 
constitutional provision hence provides strong discretion to regional governments in 
several areas of decision-making. However, the regional governments have incentives to 
comply with the policies of the federal government as long as they are financially and 
politically dependent on the center. Moreover, there are parallel power structures that 
are established by the TPLF group which keeps the regional administrations within a 
highly centralized structure of control. Though unconstitutional, the nominal 
independence of the regional governments and officials are restricted by both economic 
and political imperatives.   
 
It is within this framework of ethnic federal structure of government that the 
economic and fiscal policies of the country are being exercised. What are the 
implications of such changes in the political and policy environment in terms of the 
design and implementation of fiscal policy in the country? We explore the implications 
such constitutional provisions on the fiscal system and policy of the country and the 
sustainability and compatibility of such policies with the objectives of bringing about 
fast and shared economic growth, social transformation, and improvement in the 
standard of living of the population.  
 
4.1. Fiscal Policy Implications 
 
Fiscal federalism in Ethiopia has been put in place within the dictates of 
political imperatives. The exercise has reshaped the economic and political landscape of 
the country. One of the effects of the redrawing of the political map of the country is 
forming extremely heterogeneous economic regions. Unlike a system in which 
resources can easily flow across regions, the ethnic based political boundary establishes 
administrative, institutional and political restrictions for a full realization of the 
economic potentials of the country. When ethnic affiliation comes to influence how 
economic and political decisions are made, the economic implication is that agents 
would be bound to operate within certain regions than others. There are political risks 
that one has to assume in investing in other regional states. 
  
The federal structure of Ethiopia carved regional states that exhibit significant 




variations and heterogeneity. These diverse circumstances of regional states gave rise to 
horizontal fiscal imbalances. The regional distribution of revenue sources is such that it 
leaves most of the regional states with revenue flows far short of their expenditure 
responsibilities. The most potent sources of fiscal revenue are concentrated under the 
authority of the federal government and regional states collect revenues that could not 
cover their expenditures. For the period 1993/4 – 2000/01, the regional states as a group 
managed to finance on average only about 33.8 percent of their expenditure depending 
for about two-third of their expenditure requirements on federal subsidies. This level of 
dependency on the federal government constrains the fiscal choices of regional 
governments. 
 
One of the important issues related with the adoption of fiscal federalism is the 
extent to which it has enabled regional states to tailor their fiscal resources to the needs 
and priorities of the local population. Have they managed to identify their local 
preferences of public goods and reflect them in the budgetary allocations? Has the 
overall fiscal resource allocation of the country been geared towards the promotion of 
economic growth, improved distribution of opportunities and the reduction of poverty? 
These are some of the economic issues that are closely related to the exercise of fiscal 
federalism.  
 
The Constitution and related laws provide the framework for the assignment of 
revenues and expenditure responsibilities between the federal government and the 
regional governments. The Constitution defines the powers and responsibilities of the 
federal government that broadly include areas that have national public goods character. 
It does not, however, explicitly define the expenditure responsibilities of regional 
governments. And yet, it provides that what is not defined as federal powers and 
responsibilities is provided for regional governments. This suggests that regional 
governments have responsibilities that are critical in the provision of public services 
that influence standard of living in the regional economies such as poverty reduction 
policies, the provision of health and education services, the provision of core regional 
infrastructure, the promotion of investment and growth in the regional economies. 
 
The Ethiopian Constitution defines the assignment of tax and non-tax revenue 
sources to the regional and the federal governments (Proclamation No. 1/1995: Art. 96, 
97, 98). This assignment provides exclusive right for the federal government to tax 
international trade and the dominant share of domestic indirect taxes. These two sources 




have on average a combined share of about 64 percent of the tax base for period 1991/2 
to 2001/02. Hence, the most potent source of tax revenue is assigned to the federal 
government. The regional governments are assigned with the collection of direct taxes 
within their jurisdictions, land use fees, and taxes on a subsistence based farm 
households. Moreover, the federal government collects payroll, sales taxes and non-tax 
revenues from public enterprises owned by the federal government irrespective of their 
location across the country. In this sense, regional governments could not generate 
revenue from such enterprises located within their jurisdictions. The tax base of regional 
governments generates relatively meager revenues and is relatively stagnant with a 
property of low buoyancy. The situation is more or less similar with respect to non-tax 
revenue sources in which the federal government collects about 80 percent of non-tax 
revenue of the fiscal system. The combined regional share of revenue collection has 
remained within a narrow range of 18 to 20 percent of total revenue.  
 
The state and distribution of economic activities across the country has exerted 
its influence not only the overall revenue mobilization effort of the government but also 
on the regional distribution of revenue in the new framework of fiscal federalism. The 
fiscal implications of such patterns of distribution of economic activities are that the 
fiscal viability of regional states is highly dependent on the extent to which they manage 
to spur growth and economic transformation in their regions. This requires not only 
pursuing policies in pursuant to national policies but also engaging in activities that 
focus on the comparative advantage of regional economies and developing strategies. 
The potential advantage of the federal solution to fiscal decision-making emerges not 
only in the allocation of public resources but also by the degree to which it promotes the 
efficient allocation of economic resources and activities across regions. Without proper 
balancing of these two forces, the economic gains generated in one process might be 
compromised by the adverse effects of other processes.  
 
The concentration of government revenue at the disposal of the federal 
government relative to regional governments is accompanied by concentration of 
revenue mobilization capacity across regions. Relatively prosperous city 
administrations coexist with extremely poor and fiscally and economically dependent 
regions. Table 2 depicts the summary of horizontal fiscal imbalances in the country. It 
exhibits considerable variation across regions. Even regions with considerable own-
revenue generating capacity, such as Addis Ababa city administration, have problems 
providing basic services to all of its constituents. The horizontal fiscal imbalances, 




perhaps viewed in combination with imputed tax base of regions, could provide an even 
better picture to assess how to address priority problems in the regions.  
 





















































































Ethiopia/Regions 100.00 100.0 13.8 0.44 46.11 
Note: The regional governments are ranked by the degree of their fiscal imbalance during 2000/01. 
Despite data problem and issues, the correlation between the headcount poverty index and fiscal 
independence is weak (-0.3853). Population density turns out to have a high correlation with fiscal 
independence index (0.9085) and own per capita revenue (0.9907) perhaps due to urbanization, 
agglomeration and tax administration effects. The correlation between regional poverty and per capita 
public expenditure is rather weak (-0.1546).  
Sources: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development; FDRE (2002); World Bank, 2001. 
 The issue touches three important elements in the current fiscal policy of the 
country. First, the federal government needs to reconsider its fiscal policy and facilitate 
directly the provision of basic public services to all households irrespective of their 
residence across regions instead of just leaving the matter to financially dependent 
regional governments. This is justified on the ground that even in Addis Ababa and Dire 
Dawa, where the own revenue is relatively high, about a third of their population live 
under the national absolute poverty line with limited access to basic public services. 
Second, if the current arrangement is to continue, it is imperative that in the allocation 
formula of federal grants, proper weighting is attached to the actual contribution of 
regions to the tax base of the revenues of the federal government. The third alternative 
might involve changing the relative weight of federal grants distribution in favor of 
poverty indictors.      
 








share of revenue (%) 
Combined regions’ share 



































1993/4-2000/01 17.7 35.4 0.4804 






 is combined 
revenue of regions and R is the consolidated revenue of the government, E
R
 measures the amount of 
combined expenditure of regions whereas E measures the total (federal plus regional governments) 
expenditure.  
Source: Computed based on data from Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 
 
The assignment of revenue sources and expenditure responsibilities between 
the federal government and the regional governments is such that almost all of the 
regional governments can generate own revenue that can cover only part of their 
expenditure requirements. This mismatch between revenue generating capacity of 
regions and their expenditure responsibility has given rise to the problem of vertical 
fiscal imbalances. As table 3 depicts, the regional governments have a combined 
expenditure responsibility of about 35 percent of total consolidated government 
expenditure whereas their share of own revenue was just about 18 percent. This is a 
clear indication of situation where revenue decentralization is smaller than expenditure 
decentralization the apparent consequence of which is the emergence of vertical fiscal 
imbalance. 
 
The extent of vertical fiscal imbalance in Ethiopia is quite high. The 
dependence of regional governments on the federal grants is so significant that without 
federal grants most of the regions could not even cover their recurrent expenditures. It is 
therefore clear that the fiscal policy stance of the federal government directly affects the 
policy choice variables at the regional levels despite the nominal fiscal autonomy that 
the regional governments seem to exercise.   
 
4.2. Federal Grants and Intergovernmental Transfer Issues 
 




Fiscal imbalances emerge from the interactions of fiscal policy stance, 
distribution of the tax base, and the state and distribution of economic development 
across the country. The government has put in place mechanisms to subsidize the fiscal 
short-falls of regional governments. The magnitude and distribution of such federal 
subsidies poses two political economic problems: deciding the aggregate amount of 
federal subsidies from the total purse of the federal government and distributing this 
amount across regional governments.  
 
The Constitution, as well as the various laws related to fiscal policy, does not 
specify the absolute or relative magnitude of aggregate budgetary grants pool for the 
federal grant. The Constitution, (Article 90), states a general principle in which, given 
the resource constraints, policies shall be aimed to provide all Ethiopians access to 
health and education, clean water, housing, food and social security. The actual 
execution of such principle has been constrained by the budgetary allocation preference 
of the federal government. The practice is that the federal government develops an 
envelope public expenditure budget. The allocation of funds between the federal and the 
regional governments has been made on an ad hoc basis combining budget requests 
from regions and the budgetary preferences and allocation decisions of the federal 
government. This makes the pool of the federal grant somewhat unpredictable from the 
perspective of regional governments.  
Once the pool of federal grants is determined in such a manner, with some 
offset adjustment for expected external aid and grants to regional governments, the 
federal government provides unconditional block grants according to a grant formula. 
The regional governments have the discretion as to detailed allocation and management 
of such federal grants. In recent years, the federal government on average provided 
subsides to regions to the extent of about 36 percent of the consolidated government 
revenue and external grants. This pool of the federal grants is the most important 
determinant of the actual amount of resources at the disposal of regional governments.  
  
To address this problem of fiscal imbalance, the federal government has used 
grant formula to distribute federal grants that take into account a composite of several 
indicative variables. These variables include population, composite index of level of 
development, sector performance and recently an index of poverty situation in the 
respective regions. The grant distribution formula has been frequently adjusted to 
improve fair distribution of resources and encouraging efficiency and effort of regional 
governments to mobilize resources from local sources.  





The initial phase of the process followed an ad hoc procedure of grant 
distribution. Since 1994, however, the federal government has adopted the more 
conventional approach and relatively transparent distribution formula to determine the 
share of regional governments from the pool of federal grants. The initial phase of this 
practice provided equal weight for three indicators: population, level of development 
and revenue effort. This was changed in 1998 and in 2001 and it is currently under 
revision. Given the absolute and relative magnitude of the federal grants to the regional 
governments, it remains to be a typical political economy issue with potentials for 
conflict of interest between the federal government and regional governments as well as 
across regional governments.  
 
A closer observation of the federal grant distribution formula, as summarized in 
table 4, reveals important issues. The relative weight of population of regions in the 
formulae increased from a third to 60 percent in 1998 and then reduced to 55 percent in 
2001. Currently, there is a proposal to further change the relative weights in favor of 
population share. This would change the relative share of federal grants allocation 
across regions. The frequent changes in the formula suggest genuine effort to make the 
formula reflect the understated or omitted variables as far as more and reliable 
information is available. However, it is also a typical behavior of agents that attempt to 
maximize their share irrespective of what would happen to the rest of the constituents. 
This is how regional governments can externalize their expenditure decisions especially 
when there are rooms to generate resources without increasing taxes on the local 
population.    
 









1.Index of Population 
2.Composite Inverted Index of 
development 
3.Index of own revenue raising effort 
















Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 
 
The current distribution of federal grants attaches higher weight to population 
share of the regional states. The regional pattern of population distribution is so uneven 
that about 80 percent of the population lives in three regional states whose collective 




share of federal subsidies is two-third of total federal grants. The other variable in the 
federal grant formula is a composite index of development that combines index of unit 
expenditure variable and sector indicators of development in areas such as education, 
health, road, and access to water. These are proxy indicators of the level of development 
variation across regions. The inverted level of development index has been assigned 20 
percent weight since 2001. The third category of variables consists indicators of the 
effort of regional governments to increase own revenue from sources assigned to them 
and how these resources are used to improve budgetary performance. Own revenue 
raising efforts relative to regional income, adjusted to population share and revenue 
base, is given 73 percent whereas the remaining 27 percent is intended to capture how 
much budgetary allocation has improved basic services, such as primary school 
participation, rural road and health services, in the respective regions. This is an 
important element in the rationalization of public resource utilization and it has 15 
percent relative weight in the distribution of federal grants.  
 
Since 2001, the federal grant distribution formula has introduced the 
distribution of poverty across regions with a 10 percent weight to determine the share of 
regions in the total pool of federal grants. The introduction of this variable is an 
important development provided that reliable data could be generated to monitor the 
level and changes in poverty across regions. Since it measures directly the resource 
needs of regions to address such a critical problem in the system, the indicators of 
poverty as a gauge to distribute public resources and preferably to finance programs that 
would enable the poor have opportunities to escape chronic poverty on a sustainable 
basis would have important growth and fiscal implications.   
 
Table 5: Ethiopia: Regional Share of Federal Grants (percentage share) 
   Year 
 
Regions 
1993/4 1994/5 95/6-97/8 1998/9- 





























































































Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 
 
 Table 5 summarizes the actual share in federal grants received by regional 
governments. The distribution pattern reveals that there are important variations in the 
share of regions. It is also important to note that despite the changes in the weights 
attached to the underlying variables, the actual share of regional states from the pool of 
the federal grant shows only marginal changes. It implies that the most important 
determinant of the actual amount of federal grants received by regional governments is 
the size of pool more than how it is distributed across regions. This critical power 
remains in the firm hands of the federal government.  
 
One important practical issue in the distribution of federal grants is related to 
the treatment of planned foreign aid and assistance to regional governments either 
directly or through the federal government. The current practice is a compensation 
scheme in which federal grants are extended taking into account the full amount of 
foreign aid extended to the respective regional governments (World Bank, 2000, 2001). 
This practice appeals from the perspective of fair overall distribution of supplements to 
own revenue of regional governments. However, it can also have a side effect of 
discouraging foreign aid mobilization effort of regional government and by implication 
the concentration of foreign aid at the disposal of federal government. It is nonetheless 
plausible to provide regional governments the incentive to mobilize external grants that 
do not entail external debt servicing.  
 
The problems of macroeconomic instability effects and the possible emergence 
of the problem of the commons make allowing regional governments borrowing from 
abroad a contentious proposition. This is particularly the case when the benefits from 
projects financed by such borrowing accrue to specific regions and yet the obligation to 
servicing external debt is shared by all regions, particularly foreign exchange earning 
regions. However, when it comes to external grants with no debt repayment obligations 
attached, there are important benefits to regions and their population. The concern of 
uneven distribution of such grants could well be compensated by the benefits that could 
be generated as a result of concerted effort on the side of regional governments to 
mobilize external resources for social and economic infrastructure and capacity building 
purposes.  





The fact that resources are unevenly distributed and economic activities are 
concentrated across regions implies uneven distribution of revenue mobilization 
capacity of regions. This would in turn affect the capacity of regions to provide public 
services for the citizens under their jurisdictions. If the federal government is committed 
to the principle that at least a minimum level of public goods and services should be 
provided for every citizen irrespective of their location of residence, allocation of 
resources for such purposes through the federal grant mechanism would have important 
equity effects. In this context, it would be necessary to identify the minimum set of 
public services that every region should be able to provide irrespective of their actual 
capacity to generate own revenue. The minimum set, of course, is subject to variation 
depending on the actual level of development of the country and across regions.  
The current practice uses the poverty index as a yardstick to distribute federal 
grants to regional governments. However, it falls short of ensuring how such funds are 
used to improve the poverty situation of the poor households in the country. It is 
important to establish a mechanism that would ensure such funds be directly used to 
create opportunities for the poor to escape poverty and in the worst cases to reduce the 
suffering of the poor from destitution. Despite the variations in the index of poverty 
across regions, it is clear that poverty is a nationally shared phenomenon that deserves 
to be the responsibility of the federal government. Given the importance that poverty 
targets have received in recent years both locally and internationally, it should be 
conceivable to generate enough economic and political support for such schemes to be 
implemented. 
  
When the mismatch between the expenditure responsibility and the revenue 
assignment is so significant, the federal government retains the key power and 
influences decisions at the regional level. In areas of expenditure assignment, the 
federal government needs to take direct responsibility to create opportunities for poor 
households irrespective of their location in the country based on a set of threshold 
criteria. The current practice attempts to address the problem indirectly through the 
regional administration and it does not address the problem for several reasons. First, 
the regional governments receive unconditional block grants and their decision-making 
process might not directly and necessarily address the problems of extremely poor 
households in their jurisdiction. In a country where about 45 percent of the population 
lives in destitution, such indirect processes of budgetary assistance would hardly trickle 
down to the poor. Second, with such a level of vertical fiscal imbalances and most 




regions are dependent on federal grants to carry out their expenditure responsibilities. It 
is therefore justifiable, both on equity and poverty reduction considerations, for the 
federal government to directly provide social security assistance to those poor 
households.  
 
The practice of providing unconditional block federal grants to regional 
governments has important bearings on the fiscal management of regions and how 
resources would be channeled to lower levels of government. The federal grants do not 
address the intra-regions distribution of fiscal subsidies. Regional level of centralized 
decision-making and fiscal behavior could indeed nullify the potential advantages that 
fiscal decentralization is supposed to bring by diversifying outputs of the public sector. 
 
 What are the main effects of the practice of fiscal federalism on the policy-
making behavior of the public sector? There are important mechanisms by which the 
practice of fiscal federalism affects the aggregate behavior and performance of the 
public sector in the national economy. In this respect, we address three main areas of 
possible implications. The first issue is related to the impact of fiscal federalism in 
influencing the fiscal discipline of the public sector. As we have already observed in the 
previous sections, the fiscal aggregates of the general government exhibit both 
continuity and innovation. Despite the reform policies, the government is still running 
persistent and unsustainable fiscal deficit. The fact that the main driving force behind 
the deficits is the burgeoning recurrent expenditure suggests that there is no clear turn in 
the policy stance of the government. The effect of fiscal decentralization on the 
expenditure behavior of both the federal and the regional governments has been to 
expand government expenditure, especially recurrent component of expenditure. The 
increased execution of public expenditure by the regional government is one important 
aspect, and a potential source of efficiency, in the exercise of fiscal decision-making 
power. However, this should be accompanied by reorientation and reduction in federal 
expenditure so that the consolidated government expenditure is in line with revenue and 
economic growth path of the country.   
 
 The second impact is related to public resource allocation behavior. There were 
important shifts in emphasis in the allocation of public resources. As figure 2 portrays, 
the most important shift was the reorientation of public expenditure from defense 
related expenditure to social and economic development expenditures. Expenditure 
reorientation towards health and education sectors improved not only the efficiency 




public resource allocation but also allowed the exercise of overall fiscal discipline. It 
was possible to improve the fiscal balance and at the same time to increase the share of 
capital and social sector expenditure. The practice of fiscal federalism contributed 
positively in the process since the sub-national governments allocated an important 
share of their budgets for poverty and social development oriented activities. This 
encouraging development could not continue due to the shift in the policy stance of the 
federal government. The main victims of such a policy shift were the health, education 
and other social sectors and capital projects with dampening effect on the performance 
of the national economy.        
   
       The third element of policy interest is how the behavior of the public sector and the 
practice of fiscal federalism affected the overall performance of the economy and the 
behavior of other economic agents in the system. The reorientation of the activities of 
the public sector in areas in which normally the private sector is reluctant to operate or 
where market failure is predominant would have a crowding-in effect on the private 
sector and the degree to which the economy can realize its potentials. The fiscal 
performance of the government can improve the growth and tax-paying capacity of the 
private sector by allocating resources to activities that have public goods characters and 
also address the provision of core infrastructure to the private sector. There were 
important shifts in the policy stance of the government from a policy that categorically 
discourages the private sector to that, at least nominally, encourages and acknowledges 
the role of the private sector in the economy. There were important policy measures that 
opened space for private sector participation in various areas of economic activities. 
However, there are still considerable ways to go before the policy environment is 
conducive enough for private sector development.  
 
The introduction of fiscal decentralization has had mixed effects on the 
participation of the private sector in economic activities. The practice, accompanied by 
the underlying tone of ethnic federalism, has introduced a political risk factor in the 
investment decision-making. There is still a tendency of the private sector to avoid 
long-term investment activities in which routine interaction with political decision-
makers and hence interference is unavoidable. Moreover, there are factors that 
encourage expansion of public sector consumption expenditure at the expense of capital 
accumulation and hence jeopardizing the sustainability of economic growth. It is 
therefore clear that despite the overall improvement in the policy environment in which 
the private sector operates and the attempts by the government to reorient its 




expenditure, the public sector and its recurrent consumption behavior has resulted in the 
relative expansion of public sector consumption in the economy, allowed the 
predominance of a large and yet inefficient government sector in the economy, that has 
hampered the resource allocation efficiency and sustainability of growth in the 
economy.   
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Ethiopia has introduced a unique form of fiscal federalism in the context of 
ethnic federalism. The process is still in progress that decentralization of fiscal decision-
making power has not yet effectively reached the basic unit of administration in the 
federal structure. The system hence effectively has a two-tier structure of fiscal 
federalism: the federal government and the regional states. The regional governments 
have been constitutionally vested with extensive decision-making power. However, the 
fact that the federal government still centralizes the fiscal means of executing fiscal 
responsibilities indicates that there is a de facto centralization of fiscal decision-making. 
This is reflected by excessive dependence of regional governments on federal grants to 
finance even recurrent expenditures within their jurisdictions. The fiscal system is 
characterized by both vertical and horizontal imbalances that require further 
decentralization of revenue sources that commensurate the expenditure responsibilities 
of the regional governments. This aspect of actual centralization in fiscal relations is 
accompanied by a parallel structure of political centralization that robes the very 
inspiration of the process of decentralization. 
 
 The practice of fiscal decentralization in Ethiopia, and the political and 
economic environment in which it operates, has so far failed to improve the efficiency 
of the public sector by diversifying output and tailoring it to the preferences of the local 
population. Moreover, centralization of fiscal decision-making is exercised not only at 
the federal level but also at regional government level. Given the prevailing vertical 
imbalance, the system has not internalized the cost of their expenditure decisions by 
regions. This in turn tends to give incentive to expansionary fiscal policy stance and 
bigger government that might not necessarily translate into strong and effective 
government. When such practices prevail, the cost of regional and federal fiscal 
decisions would be born by economic agents and the economy. It is such a policy stance 
that erodes its sustainability, allows the breach of fiscal discipline, and in the process 
discourages the realization of whatever potentials available in the private sector, market 




forces, and the national economy. It is therefore important that the practice of fiscal 
federalism in Ethiopia be reoriented to achieve fiscal discipline, selective intervention to 
stimulate economic activities and diversify public outputs at the local levels to reflect 
local priorities and address core economic, social and political problems of the country.   
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 AnnexTable1 -Ethiopia: Profile of regional income and poverty indicators 
Real Expenditure (Income) per 
capita (Birr) 




























































Total 1088 1057 0.46 0.44 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and 
FDRE 2002. 
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Figure 1: Ethiopia: Structure of Tax Revenue The structure of tax revenue has changed considerably 
over the last two decades. The government is increasingly becoming dependent on taxes from 
international trade and especially taxes on imports. The devaluation of the currency in 1993 and the 
subsequent depreciation has resulted in the expansion of the tax base even if the actual volume and hard 




currency denominated amount of transaction has not grown as fast. The impact was so significant that 
even with reductions in the rate of import duty and transaction tax, the overall tax revenue generation has 
shown significant increment. For 1991/92 to 2001/02, the share of taxes on imports in total tax revenue 
collection was about 37 percent.     
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Figure 2: Ethiopia: Allocation of Recurrent Expenditure by Function (1980/81 – 2001/02). The 
allocation to general services has been dominated by the absorption of budgetary resources to defense 
expenditure that in turn influenced the overall allocation pattern of public resources. The budgetary 
allocation of the government to economic services, the main target for crowding out effect of defense 
related expenditure, is almost equal to the allocation for servicing the debt obligations of the government.    
